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Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe
MATTHEW RENDALL*
Abstract. Why do great powers expand? Oﬀensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states
wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony
nearly always do. Mearsheimer’s evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four
crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and
France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chances to
bid for hegemony in 1815 and to topple Ottoman Turkey in 1829. Defensive realism gives a
better account of the Concert of Europe, because it combines structural realism with
non-realist theories of state preferences.
Why do great powers expand? John Mearsheimer’s answer is ‘The international
system made me do it’. In a much-praised recent book, he claims states wage an
endless struggle for power. Mearsheimer heads a school of thought known as
oﬀensive realism, which argues that international anarchy drives states to expand
whenever opportunity beckons. ‘There are no status quo powers in the international
system’, Mearsheimer claims, ‘save for the occasional hegemon that wants to
maintain its dominating position over potential rivals’. If China continues to grow at
its present pace, it will make a run for hegemony in Northeast Asia. Rather than
pinning its hopes on the pacifying eﬀects of trade, the spread of democracy or
international institutions – none of which can bail us out – the United States should
try to sabotage Chinese growth now.1
Many realists expect bids for hegemony to backfire by provoking balancing
coalitions. Since Napoleon’s or Hitler’s attempts to conquer Europe scarcely
maximised their states’ security, defensive realists like Jack Snyder attribute such
policies to internal factors.2 Committed to a structural explanation of international
aggression, oﬀensive realists will have none of this. Structural theorists have
been criticised for blaming even Napoleon and Hitler on the security dilemma.3
Mearsheimer admits the charge. Germany and militarist Japan were ‘not engaged in
self-defeating behavior fueled by malign domestic politics’.4
* The author thanks Deborah Boucoyannis, Keir Lieber and anonymous referees for comments on
earlier drafts, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Quick
Response Fund of the University of Nottingham for financial support.
1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 2
and ch. 10.
2 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991).
3 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, in Benjamin
Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 90–121.
4 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, p. 171.
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Does every state that spots a chance for hegemony really make a run for it? Are
the rest Nazi Germany wannabes, but too weak to pull it oﬀ? This article argues that
Mearsheimer’s evidence shows a selection bias, focusing on aggressive states in
aggressive periods. To demonstrate my point, I examine four of the worst European
crises between 1814 and 1848. Contrary to the claims of some scholars,5 but
consistent with both schools of realist theory, I show that the balance of power went
on working in the Vienna era, and did much to restrain Russia, Prussia and especially
France. At the same time, all three showed restraint, passing up gains that greedier
or more reckless powers might have bid for. Had Mearsheimer examined this period,
he could have reached quite diﬀerent conclusions. The Concert of Europe’s members
were good defensive realists. But they responded to structural constraints as they did
largely because their leaders and domestic regimes were cautious and moderate – in
other words, for unit-level reasons.
Defensive realism, properly conceived, gives a better account of the Concert of
Europe than its oﬀensive counterpart. Neorealist theory predicts that states will seek
to survive,6 common sense predicts that they will seek to avoid military disaster, and
Concert-era leaders sought to do both. Structural realism can explain Napoleon and
Hitler only by assuming that they were not security-maximisers, but unusually greedy
gamblers whom even great risks could not deter.7 But defensive realism gains this
explanatory power by smuggling liberalism in through the back door, exposing to
attack from both oﬀensive realist and liberal critics.8 The solution, as Jeﬀrey Legro
and Andrew Moravcsik have proposed, is explicitly to recognise that defensive
‘realism’ is a synthesis of realist and non-realist theories. Realism predicts that states
will respond as security maximisers to structural incentives; other theories explain
cases when they do not.9
Eat or be eaten
For Mearsheimer, world politics is a jungle, and every great power a jungle cat. When
there is a rough balance of power, they may hold each other in check. But now and
then one state pulls ahead. In this situation of ‘unbalanced multipolarity’, it usually
makes a run for regional hegemony. Most powers are too weak to try, but these ‘still
act oﬀensively to amass as much power as [they] can, because states are almost always
better oﬀ with more rather than less power’. The choice is to eat or be eaten. Even
colossal gambles such as Hitler’s can be reasonable, since blocking coalitions may not
form in time, and ‘the security benefits of hegemony are enormous’ if they pay oﬀ.10
5 See notably Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest upon a Balance of Power?’
American Historical Review, 97 (June 1992), pp. 683–706.
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), p. 91.
7 Cf. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 89; Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias’,
pp. 106–7.
8 Jeﬀrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still A Realist?’ International Security, 24
(Fall 1999), pp. 5–55; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s
World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 27–34.
9 Jeﬀrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm?
(Or, Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)’, International Security, 25 (Summer 2000), pp. 188–91; cf.
Jeﬀrey W. Taliaferro, ibid., p. 181.
10 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 2–3, 33–5, 44–5, 211–13, 233, ch. 9.
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Mearsheimer is not just saying that states seize opportunities to expand on the
cheap. The debate between oﬀensive and defensive realists is often cast as whether
states seek to expand or try to preserve the status quo,11 but this description of
defensive realism is – or at any rate should be – a straw man. To claim that states
would pass up cost-free opportunities for power and influence is alien to any form of
realism, which emphasises self-help in an anarchic world. Nothing in the logic of
defensive realism precludes limited opportunistic expansion,12 particularly into
power vacuums. Fareed Zakaria’s finding that around the end of the nineteenth
century ‘[t]he United States did not expand against strong states that posed a great
threat . . . but largely against areas that were weak’13 is just what defensive realism
should predict. Whether a given act of aggression was reasonable or excessive may
sometimes be a matter of opinion. But what unambiguously distinguishes defensive
realists is their claim that because states generally balance would-be hegemons, bids
to dominate a system of great powers are quixotic.14 Unit-level factors, rather than the
pressures of anarchy, explain wild gambles such as Hitler’s.
In contrast to defensive realists, Mearsheimer remains consistently structural in his
theory. He explicitly rejects the distinction between rational limited aggression and
bids for hegemony, arguing that the latter can also be reasonable responses to
systemic incentives.15 Moreover, structure makes even states that cannot hope for
hegemony ready to run big risks and pay high costs. Mearsheimer presents the cases
of Japan from 1868–1945, Prussia/Germany from 1862–1945, the USSR from
1917–1991, Britain from 1792–1945 and the United States from 1800–1990, showing
that all but Britain – separated from the Continent by the English Channel –
expanded aggressively into its surrounding region.16 US expansion was largely into a
vacuum – consistent with defensive realism. If, on the other hand, Germany and
Japan are the norm, defensive realists really do have problems.
Fortunately, Mearsheimer’s case selection is biased. He focuses on history’s bully
boys at the expense of others such as post-Napoleonic France and Austria. What is
more, he examines particularly aggressive periods in their histories.17 This is partly
because making potential and actual military power criteria for being a great power
means excluding some states that exercise restraint. Most scholars consider Prussia a
great power throughout the nineteenth century, but it enters Mearsheimer’s book
only when Bismarck takes the reins. Postwar West Germany – also left out –
lacked the military muscle to compete with the superpowers, but was this simply, as
Mearsheimer claims, because American occupation prevented it from doing so?18 An
unbiased test would examine all states with the potential to become military powers,
capturing both revisionist states that bought the weapons, and status-quo states that
11 Colin Elman, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’ Security
Studies, 6 (Autumn 1996), pp. 27–8; Eric J. Labs, ‘Beyond Victory: Oﬀensive Realism and the
Expansion of War Aims’, Security Studies, 6 (Summer 1997), pp. 9–11.
12 Jeﬀrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International
Security, 25 (Winter 2000/1), p. 152.
13 Zakaria, Wealth to Power, p. 184.
14 Cf. Elman, ‘Horses for Courses’, pp. 28–9; Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking Under Anarchy’, p. 154.
15 Tragedy, pp. 21, 39–40, 210–13.
16 Ibid., chs. 6–7.
17 Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Mearsheimer’s World: Oﬀensive Realism and the Struggle for Security’,
International Security, 27 (Summer 2002), p. 161.
18 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 78–9. If in 1970 Bonn had announced plans to go nuclear and told
American troops to go home, would Washington have gone to war to stop it?
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did not.19 In the nineteenth century this would mean adding France, pre-unification
Prussia, Austria and Russia. Mearsheimer might argue that Prussia and Austria,
though considered great powers, were too weak to embark on aggression. But if so,
this should also have been true of post-unification Italy, whose belligerence he cites
in support of his theory.20 Similarly, if Soviet behaviour counts as evidence, surely we
should include the Russian empire – the strongest power in continental Europe for
several decades after 1815.
In the following sections I examine four of the most dangerous crises between 1814
and 1848: the Polish–Saxon crisis at the Congress of Vienna, the Greek revolution of
the 1820s, the outbreak of the Belgian revolution in 1830 and the Syrian crisis of
1840. In each case I focus on the states most likely to start a major war, and ask what
stopped them from doing so. If Mearsheimer’s theory is right, a potential hegemon
should hold back only when faced by a deterrent threat at least as clear, potent and
credible as Germany faced in 1914 and 1939. His predictions about other states’
behaviour are harder to distinguish from those of defensive realism, since he claims
that great powers do not ‘charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic
victories.’21 Mearsheimer might try to explain restraint in any of these cases as a
rational cost-benefit calculation. Nevertheless, even weaker states should be hungry
predators constantly on the prowl. Certainly we should not find ‘key leaders
expressing satisfaction with the existing balance of power, especially when their state
had the capability to alter it.’22
In one sense, this article presents a hard test for Mearsheimer’s theory, since this
is a period widely thought to be characterised by status-quo states. But in another
sense, these are easy cases, since by focusing on major crises I emphasise situations
of conflict, while ignoring the possibility that in the Vienna system many potential
disputes never arose at all.23 Moreover, I focus on three land powers – Russia,
Prussia and France – that Mearsheimer describes as highly aggressive in other
periods. If even these three exercised self-restraint, this should also have been true of
Britain and Austria, the poster-child of satisfied powers. And if the Congress era is
a tough case for Mearsheimer, my case selection is scarcely more biased than his own.
Russia and the Polish-Saxon crisis
The great powers squared oﬀ at the Congress of Vienna in the autumn of 1814 over
the fate of central Europe. Russia wanted to establish a new kingdom of Poland,
nominally independent, but ruled by a Russian monarch. Prussia wished to absorb
Saxony. Austria and Britain resigned themselves to giving Alexander his way in
Poland, but were determined to keep at least part of Saxony out of Prussian hands.
On 3 January 1815, Austria, Britain and France concluded a defensive alliance, to
which Bavaria and Hesse–Darmstadt quickly adhered. But by the time Hanover and
the Netherlands joined, war no longer seemed a risk. Even before the treaty, the tsar
made it clear he was looking for a compromise. Once he had what he wanted in
19 On status-quo and revisionist states, see Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias’.
20 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 171, 202–9.
21 Ibid., p. 37.
22 Ibid., pp. 37, 169–70, quotation from p. 170.
23 On non-barking dogs, see Bruce Russett, ‘Correspondence: The Democratic Peace’, International
Security, 19 (Spring 1995) p. 167.
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Poland, he diluted his support for Prussia, which had to settle for half of Saxony and
fewer than half of its inhabitants.24
Some authors hold that faced with a blocking coalition, the Prussians and
Russians backed down.25 As Paul Schroeder points out, however, Russia actually
won its confrontation over Poland, while Prussia could not resist on its own.26 The
more interesting question is why the Russians did not seize the chance to start a war
for hegemony in Europe. True, by Mearsheimer’s criteria, Russia was not a potential
hegemon, which must be both military and economic powerhouses. Yet while the
Russian case does not test his theory directly, we can test his assumption that regional
hegemony is so desirable that statesmen will run great risks if they believe they have
a chance to gain it. As he himself observes, while ‘explanatory power is the ultimate
criterion for assessing theories . . . a theory based on unrealistic or false assumptions
will not explain much about how the world works.’27
Russia’s only significant ally would have been Prussia, which was willing to fight
but whose finances and military were weak.28 Its main enemies would have been
Austria, France and possibly Britain. Austria’s emperor talked tough, and the
military and Viennese elite were spoiling for a showdown. The French delegation at
Vienna put the Austrian and Russian forces at about 300,000 troops each, with
Prussia having half that number. Many smaller German states opposed Russia.29
Still, it is not clear that Vienna would have won a war. Its finances were a disaster and
it faced unrest in its Italian provinces. Even early in the crisis, when it seemed Berlin
might join the Western powers to block Russia, Prussian oﬃcials doubted both
German powers’ capability to do so. After Prussia switched sides, Austria’s foreign
minister, Prince Metternich, confessed that if Berlin remained in Saxony, Austria
could do no more than withhold recognition.30
24 Louis de Viel-Castel, Histoire de la restauration, vol. 2 (Paris: Michel Lévy frères, 1860), p. 217;
Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994), pp. 524–38; Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814–1815 (New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1966 [1919]), pp. 124–34.
25 Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and
Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967
[1955]), p. 243; Klothilde von Olshausen, Die Stellung der Grossmächte zur sächsischen Frage auf
dem Wiener Kongress und deren Rückwirkung auf die Gestaltung der preussischen Ostgrenze
(Quakenbrück: C. Trute, 1933), pp. 95–104, 117, 121–2; N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Aleksandr Pervyi:
ego zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie, vol. 3 (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1897–98), p. 283.
26 Schroeder, Transformation, pp. 534–8.
27 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 30, 45, 350–1, quotation from p. 30.
28 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 32, 88, 103, 117; cf. Karl Griewank, Der Wiener Kongress und die
europäische Restauration, 1814/15 (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1954), pp. 247–8.
29 French delegation at Vienna to Jaucourt, 16 October 1814, in Duc de Broglie (ed.), M[emoirs] of
the Prince de T[alleyrand], vol. 2 (London: Griﬃth Farran Okeden and Welsh, 1891–92), p. 258;
Count Münster to the Prince Regent, 27 November 1814, in C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of
Castlereagh 1812–1815 (London: G. Bell, 1931), pp. 551–4, and ibid., pp. 356, 369; Enno E.
Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, vol. II: The Congress of Vienna, 1814–1815 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 258–9, and 259, n. 70; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage,
pp. 47–50, 55–6, 72–7, 81, 90, 101–2, 105, 114–16; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. 2,
pp. 201–2.
30 Reports to Hager, 9 October 1814, in Commandant M.-H. Weil (ed.), Les d[essous] du c[ongrès]
de V[ienne]: d’après les documents originaux des archives du ministère impérial et royal de l’intérieur
à Vienne, vol. 1 (Paris: Payot, 1917), p. 254; Stein to Hardenberg, beginning of November 1814, in
Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Freiherr vom und zum Stein, Briefe und amtliche Schriften, vol. 5
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1957–74), pp. 184–5; Stein diary entry, 29 October–7 November 1814,
ibid., p. 332; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 12, 65, 77–81; Webster, Castlereagh, p. 354.
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The French seemed likely to be drawn into any showdown, and those in Vienna
evidently thought the balance of power was in their favour.31 Paul Schroeder,
however, questions whether French optimism was justified:
Even if the army was ready and willing, using it would have threatened the regime. Would
the French army, moreover, willingly have fought at Britain’s side, or worse, at Austria’s?
Where would France get the money for war? [British prime minister Lord] Liverpool was
flatly unwilling to subsidize Austria . . . for a war against Russia; could he have obtained
subsidies from Parliament for France . . .?32
While an oﬃcial close to the king insisted to the Duke of Wellington that France
could and would stand up to Russia so long as Britain did not oppose it, the Duke
wrote that ‘[t]he desertion is immense, and the recruiting very slow indeed’.33 The
acting French foreign minister held that Paris could not count on public or military
enthusiasm for a war in alliance with Austria, while the French minister in St
Petersburg wrote that Russia’s army would welcome a fight.34
Nor is it clear how soon Britain would have entered a war. Foreign Secretary
Castlereagh put on a brave face in public, and argued that he could stop a Russian
invasion so long as the Low Countries were fortified.35 But Liverpool made clear he
did not consider Poland worth fighting over, and other cabinet members also
opposed intervention. Castlereagh, like Liverpool, privately acknowledged that the
British public would support war only if the Low Countries came under threat. In
any case, ‘Austria and Bavaria . . . would have to bear the first shock.’ He seems to
have been unsure whether Austria, Britain and France would prevail: according to
Louis de Viel-Castel, he thought that if they could stave oﬀ war for two years, they
could have more chance of winning. Castlereagh concluded the triple alliance on 3
January. London immediately decided to ratify it.36 By this point, however,
Alexander was already showing signs of compromise. Thus a window of opportunity
opened in late 1814, when Prussia had already aligned with St Petersburg, but before
peace with the United States freed British troops to fight in Europe,37 and before
London committed itself to aiding the Austrians and the French. The Russians did
not jump through it.
In sum, Britain would not enter a war until late in the game, and even then it was
unclear which coalition would win. Russian and Prussian chances seem as good as
31 French delegation at Vienna to Jaucourt, 16 October, 14 December 1814, and Talleyrand to Louis
XVIII, 17 October 1814: MT, vol. 2, pp. 257–8, 263, 362; Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December
1814, in C. K. Webster (ed.), B[ritish] D[iplomacy], 1813–1815: Select Documents Dealing with the
Reconstruction of Europe (London: G. Bell, 1921), p. 253; Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, pp. 41–4,
53, 97–8; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration, vol. 2, pp. 203–5.
32 Schroeder, Transformation, pp. 530–1.
33 Wellington to Castlereagh, 9 October, 5 November 1814, in Charles Vane, Marquess of
Londonderry (ed.), Memoirs and [c]orrespondence of Viscount [C]astlereagh, second Marquess of
Londonderry, vol. 10 (London: H. Colburn, 1848–53), pp. 161, 183–5; same to same, 10, 25 October
1814, in Duke of [W]ellington (ed.), S[upplementary] D[espatches], Correspondence, and
Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K.G., vol. 9 (London: John Murray,
1858–72), pp. 326, 370–1.
34 Schroeder, Transformation, p. 530, n. 14.
35 Castlereagh to Vansittart, 11 November 1814: CC, vol. 10, p. 200; French delegation at Vienna to
Jaucourt, 23 November 1814, and Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 24 November 1814: MT, vol. 2,
pp. 333, 342. Schroeder (Transformation, p. 532) seems to misinterpret Castlereagh’s letter.
36 Castlereagh to Liverpool, 5 December 1814: BD, pp. 253–4; Viel-Castel, Histoire de la Restauration,
vol. 2, p. 218; Webster, Castlereagh, pp. 351–74.
37 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 113.
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those of the Triple Alliance a century later. ‘No country . . . had such a great need of
peace as England’, writes Karl Griewank:
none was so unprepared for war as France under the unconsolidated rule of the Bourbons
. . . and Austria could also scarcely have wished for an armed altercation, in which at first
it would have confronted Prussia and Russia essentially [ziemlich] alone. . . . Prussia and
Russia . . . with their armies concentrated in central Europe, would probably have had an
initial advantage, had they been prepared to attack.
The alliance succeeded, says Griewank, not because it faced Russia and Prussia
down, but because Russia had no direct stake in the Saxon issue, and Prussia was
neither prepared nor willing to fight on its own.38
What really matters, however, is not the objective balance of power but how the
Russians saw it. In their public statements, they were cocky indeed. ‘The Russians
speak already as if they ruled the world,’ reported an Austrian informant. ‘I know
someone whom one of their ministers told that they had only one goal at present: to
preserve the preponderance that they had acquired by so many sacriﬁces, eﬀorts and
successes in Europe’.39 ‘. . . I have two hundred thousand men in the duchy of
Warsaw’, Alexander told Talleyrand. ‘Let them drive me out if they can!’40 He used
much the same language with Metternich and Castlereagh.41 Princess Bagration
claimed that she had sought to talk Alexander round on the Polish–Saxon question.
The tsar had replied ‘that he was sticking with his decision; that he would go to
Munich, then to Berlin, then to Warsaw, have himself proclaimed king of Poland,
and that he was prepared if anyone wanted to resist him’. Other oﬃcials seemed
similarly confident.42 If Alexander assumed the title of Grand Duke of Warsaw,
commented an unsigned memorandum approved by the tsar, he
will have in any future contingency yet another means of keeping Austria at bay. His
Majesty would have only to proclaim himself King of Poland to wage a war
advantageously against Austria, or even to threaten her with this change, to keep her
within her proper limits and to foil all her combinations against Russia.43
When Alexander decided to compromise, he was said to have told his Russian
companions that ‘I could certainly decide the aﬀair, as did Napoleon, by dispatching
500,000 men; but as I am not here for war, but to consolidate the tranquility of
Europe, I am abandoning my demands, and shall settle for an indemnity of part of
the Duchy’.44
All this may have been bravado. But the Russians’ internal correspondence also
suggests that they saw themselves in a strong position. ‘If Austria does not give in
with good grace, I do not know what we shall do,’ wrote one of Alexander’s dual
38 Griewank, Wiener Kongress, pp. 249–50.
39 Report to Hager, 11 October 1814: DCV, vol. 1, p. 267. Emphasis in original.
40 Talleyrand to Louis XVIII, 25 October 1814: MT, vol. 2, p. 277, but contrast same to same, 17
November 1814, ibid., pp. 325–6.
41 Mavrojeni to the Prince of Moldavia, 1 November 1814, intercepted: DCV, vol. 1, pp. 453–4,
Hegardt to Engestroem, intercepted, 12 November 1814, ibid., p. 518; Castlereagh to Liverpool, 25
November 1814: WSD, vol. 9, p. 451; contrast Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 56.
42 Reports to Hager, 3, 7, 12, 16 November 1814, and ‘M.G.’ to Hager, 22 December 1814: DCV,
vol. 1, pp. 461, 485, 511–12, 541, 712; Count Münster to the Prince Regent, 28 November 1814, in
Webster, Castlereagh, p. 555; ‘F’ to Hager, 4 January 1815: DCV, vol. 2, pp. 3–4.
43 Instructions for Razumovskii, in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (Moscow), f. 15
(Diplomaticheskii otdel), d. 533, l. 10. This passage was probably composed in early 1815, and may
have been intended as talking points for the Russian oﬃcial.
44 O. to Hager, 22 December 1814: DCV, vol. 1, 714–15. Emphasis in original.
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foreign ministers, Count Nesselrode, to his ambassador in Paris. ‘She would find the
support of England and France of no more than negative use. We have Prussia and
five hundred thousand men; thus she will only be able to use friendly representations
against us; if they fail, there will be nothing to do but to give in. . . .’45 General
Chernyshev was more cautious. ‘Certainly Russia . . . with the huge resources that
[Your Majesty’s] foresight has created for her, possessing moreover the inestimable
advantage, unique today in Europe, of having the genius of her sovereign at the head
of her armies’, he wrote to the tsar in November 1814:
is the power that should least fear the resumption of hostilities. Thus it is not so much out
of fear of war as from the lively desire to see our political course either gain us a glorious
and stable peace . . . or in case of war to assure its success through allies who, far from
fearing us, would have an interest in our success, that I have raised my voice to Your
Majesty.46
Though the following month Chernyshev expressed dismay at Russia’s diplomatic
isolation and certainty that France would enter any war against Russia, he remained
confident that Petersburg would have Prussia on its side.47
We thus have weak evidence from internal sources that Russian oﬃcials saw the
balance of power as favourable, plus a wealth of public statements. While the latter
could be bluster, they are so frequent and consistent that it seems likely they reflected
real confidence. Prussian leaders doubted in the early fall of 1814, before they had
firmly taken sides, that they and Austria could take on Russia together. Castlereagh
seemed unsure of a war’s outcome. In early December the Prussian oﬃcial
Staegemann wrote that he favoured a tough stance: Austria was weak, Britain was
tied down in the New World, war would threaten the new French government, and
a war in coalition with France would be unpopular in Germany.48 Others judged the
balance diﬀerently, but Russian leaders bent on expansion, especially when it
promised European hegemony, might well have rolled the dice.
Russian restraint in the Near East, 1821–33
If great powers are as aggressive as Mearsheimer claims, Russia should have taken all
it could get away with from its decaying neighbour, the Ottoman empire. Indeed,
many have thought that that was what Russia was trying to do. In reality, between
1821 and 1833 Russia passed up three chances to seize Constantinople. In 1833 – and
perhaps 1821 as well – fear of Western retaliation seems suﬃcient – though not
necessary – to explain Russian restraint, but in 1829 the Russians chose peace even
45 Nesselrode to Pozzo-di-Borgo, 15/27 September 1814, in Charles Pozzo di Borgo (ed.),
Correspondance diplomatique du comte Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie en France et du comte
de Nesselrode depuis la restauration des Bourbons jusqu’au congrès d’Aix-la-Chapelle, 1814–1818, vol.
1 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1890), p. 83.
46 Chernyshev memorandum to Alexander I, November 1814, in ‘Bumagi A. I. Chernysheva za
tsartsvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I. 1809–1825 gg.’, Sbornik imperatorskago russkago
istoricheskago obshchestva, 121 (1906), p. 282.
47 Chernyshev to Arakcheev, 13/25 December 1814, in N. Dubrovin (ed.), ‘Otechestvennaia voina v
pis’makh sovremennikov (1812–1815 gg.)’, Zapiski imperatorskoi akademii nauk, 43 (1882),
pp. 540–1.
48 Olshausen, Sächsische Frage, p. 88.
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though they expected no immediate resistance. A war of conquest would not have
lacked danger, but a Hitler or Napoleon would surely have run the risk.
When a revolution broke out in Greece in 1821, Turkey retaliated by massacring
Greeks and interfering with Russian shipping through the Straits. Petersburg sent an
ultimatum to Turkey, and when the Porte refused to meet it, prepared for war.
According to Harold Temperley, neither Austria nor Britain ‘was in a position to
make war or even to threaten any other Power desirous of making it.’ Had Alexander
gone to war in 1821, Schroeder notes, he had ‘every prospect of an easy military
victory. The worst that could have happened with regard to the other powers is that
Britain would have declared her neutrality. The possibility of an anti-Russian
coalition like that of 1854 was nil.’49 Still, there is some evidence that Alexander
feared that a war of conquest could bring Europe together against him. Though he
may have flirted with the idea of a great power partition of the Ottoman empire, he
decided to continue talks with Turkey.50
Balance of power considerations thus may – or may not – be suﬃcient to explain
Russian restraint, but Castlereagh and Metternich also succeeded in ‘grouping’
Alexander. Opposition to revolution and commitment to the Concert of Europe were
at least as important as fear of Western balancing in holding the tsar back. Alexander
told his foreign minister Ioannis Capodistrias the following year ‘that the preference
accorded to the Austrian system was due uniquely to the urgent and major necessity
of maintaining repose in Europe and its only guarantee – unity among the cabinets’.
An internal report prepared for Tsar Nicholas I in early 1826 noted that Alexander
had decided to wait to use force due to ‘the fear of altering the nature of his relations
with the leading European powers, the danger of thus weakening the guarantees of
the general peace’, the fear of assisting revolutionaries, and the hope of gaining allied
co-operation.51
Russia’s next chance to topple the Ottoman empire came in 1829, as its troops
approached Constantinople at the end of the Russo–Turkish War. Though Britain’s
and France’s ambassadors prepared to summon their fleets, their home capitals shied
away from a showdown. London ‘made worried declarations, but took no eﬀective
steps either to restrain Russia or to bolster up Turkey’, while Paris sought to appease
Russia with a proposal to partition the Ottoman empire.52 ‘Our victories have caught
[Wellington] oﬀ guard’, reported Russia’s ministers in London. ‘. . . No political or
military combination, whether external or internal, had been prepared against us. . . .
49 Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820–1823 (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1962), p. 238, n. 1; Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827: England,
the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World (London: G. Bell, 1925), p. 323; see also Henry A.
Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964 [1957]), p. 288; Schroeder,
Transformation, p. 618.
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About the Vienna System’, Security Studies, 9 (Summer 2000), pp. 59–63.
51 Kissinger, A World Restored, ch. 16; Rendall, ‘Russia, the Concert, and Greece’, pp. 64–71;
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Unabhängigkeitskampf 1820–1830 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975); Grégoire Yakschitch (ed.),
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California Press, 1941), pp. 86–9; Rendall, ‘Russia, the Concert, and Greece’, pp. 76–7.
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The more decisive our successes, the milder, more conciliatory and more friendly
Lord Aberdeen’s language became.’ Austria, they claimed, was no more capable of
resistance.53
Some think Russia did not take Constantinople for fear of Western retaliation,54
but the most important oﬃcials did not anticipate immediate attack. ‘The aﬀair is in
your hands’, Nesselrode told the commanding general. Britain’s and France’s
ministers in Constantinople could ‘no longer do any good in the negotiations, and
very little harm, when one considers the magnificent position in which we are placed
by your victories’. Nicholas was similarly confident: In London, ‘they see and no
longer fear the collapse of the Ottoman empire and to see us the master of
Constantinople. . . . But . . . let us be more calm, more modest, more generous and
more consistent than ever; those are the triumphs I seek, and God preserve me from
seeking any others. . . .’55
Though the Russians believed, as Nesselrode told the tsar three and a half years
later, that ‘a single word from Your Majesty would have suﬃced to erase
Turkey from among the governments of Europe’, Nicholas preferred ‘the indefinite
prolongation of the Ottoman empire’ to the risk that it would be replaced by a new
and stronger neighbour.56 In a memorandum to a high-level committee on Near
Eastern policy, Dmitrii Dashkov held that Russia
needs not new acquisitions or the expansion of her borders, but their security and the
spread of her influence among neighbouring peoples, and that . . . she can achieve more
easily by prolonging the existence of the Ottoman empire. . . . There was a time when a
partition of Turkey might enter into the secret calculations of Russian diplomacy. Today,
when the borders of the Empire stretch from the White Sea to the Danube and the Araks,
from Kamchatka to the Vistula, very few acquisitions can be of use to it.57
One ground for Russia’s satisfaction, to be sure, was the belief that its victory had
already placed Turkey under its thumb, and it was better to dominate the empire than
to destroy it. Petersburg also stopped short because it did not believe Russia could
take all of Turkey if the empire collapsed. Instead, it would have to share the remains
with the other powers, some of which might make relative gains.58 Yet why could
Russia not have taken the lion’s share? Nicholas and Nesselrode did not anticipate
immediate resistance. Rather, the foreign minister and other high oﬃcials feared that
toppling the empire would lead to conflict over the long term. ‘However resigned and
powerless they may be at the present moment’, Nesselrode wrote in an internal
memorandum, ‘we should soon see combinations arising against us whose conse-
quences would inevitably kindle a general war in Europe’.59 In foregoing short-term
53 V. N. Vinogradov, ‘Les discussions sur la Grèce à Londres durant la guerre de 1828–1829’, in Les
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R[ossiiskoi] I[mperii], (Moscow), f. 137 (Otchety MID), op. 475, 1831–32, d. 2, ll. 161 ob.-162.
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58 Ibid., pp. 77–9.
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gains for fear of provoking long-run balancing, Petersburg was acting as defensive
realists prescribe. Moreover, while Russia exacted some modest territorial gains on
its Asian frontier with Turkey, fundamentally it ‘was not interested in territorial
expansion at this time, at least not in Europe’, as Schroeder observes. ‘All that we
could wish for has been accomplished’, Nicholas told his brother, ‘and our
guarantees are huge’.60
Russia’s intervention in Turkey four years later showed the same mix of deterrence
and self-restraint. The viceroy of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, had invaded Syria and now
threatened Constantinople. In desperation Turkey asked for aid against its rebellious
vassal. Russian troops landed on the Bosphorus, and stayed for half a year. On 8 July
1833 the Russians concluded a defensive alliance with Turkey requiring the latter to
close the Straits to warships. Two days later they left. In 1834 Russia agreed to speed
up its evacuation of Turkey’s provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which it had
occupied since 1829, in exchange for a small slice of territory along the border with
Georgia.61
This time the Russians clearly worried about provoking a balancing coalition. Of
the other great powers, only Britain and France protested against the intervention,
and even they did not oﬀer forceful opposition. All the same, the Russians believed
that it would be dangerous to go too far. ‘From the beginning’, Nesselrode wrote:
we have established the principle of appearing in the theatre of events solely as the Porte’s
auxiliaries and at the formal demand of the sultan. By this we have legitimated our action,
and disarmed Europe. . . . But from the moment we changed our system and acted . . . not
in favour of, but in spite of the Porte, we should be sure to unite all the powers against us,
and from that time on our role would become diﬃcult to maintain, unless we decided to
devote all our resources to it [unclear word or words] plunge Russia into a general war.
This is surely not the will of the Emperor.
Russia took pains to square Austria before and during the intervention, for, as the
tsar’s confidant General Paskevich wrote, ‘[i]f we go in on our own, we shall have all
Europe as enemies’.62
But again, the Russians were also easy to deter. ‘What would I gain from the
conquest of Turkey?’ Nicholas asked one of his generals in late 1833. ‘To station
forces there? But would Austria allow me to do so? What advantages would there be
from that for our Mother Russia, that is, for the provinces: Yaroslavl, Moscow,
Vladimir and others? Poland is enough for me as it is.’ When the Russian commander
in Moldavia and Wallachia urged prolonging occupation of the provinces,
Nesselrode questioned whether it would pay for itself and warned that in any case ‘it
is by no means the intention of the monarch to extend the borders of his empire to
the Danube’. He wrote to the tsar that henceforth Russia’s only aim in the Near East
would be to preserve its existing treaties. Nicholas took a similar view. ‘Not new
conquests but the management of [Russia’s] regions’, he told his heir in 1835, ‘should
henceforth be your only concern’.63
60 Rendall, ‘Russia, the Concert, and Greece’, pp. 74, 77–9, 84–5, quotation from p. 74; Schroeder,
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62 Ibid., pp. 46–8.
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Hypocrisy? At this very time the Russians were conquering the Caucasus. But this
is the kind of opportunistic expansion the logic of defensive realism predicts. Whereas
they faced only weak adversaries in the Caucasus, further expansion into Europe
would bring them into conflict with other great powers. There was no need to run
such risks when they had already achieved defensible frontiers. ‘Russia’s geographi-
cal position is so favourable that it renders her practically independent, so far as her
own interests are concerned, of events in Europe’, Nicholas wrote in an internal
memorandum at the beginning of the 1830s, ‘she has nothing to fear; her frontiers are
suﬃcient for her; she has nothing to desire in that respect. . . .’64 With friendly
neighbours, a prominent oﬃcial wrote in 1838 to the crown prince, Russia was now
‘free to follow the impulse of a magnanimous policy’. When Catherine II had come
to power, Russia had faced threats from Poland and Turkey, the latter of which also
blocked its access to the Black Sea. ‘At that time, it sought to expand; today, it sees
its sole glory in preserving and governing wisely the vast countries that it possesses,
in fortifying more and more their indissoluble unity’.65
Russia, Prussia and the Belgian crisis, 1830
Belgium’s uprising against Dutch rule in 1830 caused what one historian calls ‘the
first major crisis of the post-Napoleonic period that actually threatened to develop
into a major European war’.66 While Austria and the Wellington cabinet in Britain
deplored the Belgian revolt, neither was able to act itself. France, which might have
aided Belgium – and did, later in the crisis – was divided, many of its forces were in
Algeria and Greece, and those that remained were of doubtful reliability.67 Of all the
powers, Russia was most eager to intervene. Nicholas had personal ties and financial
interests in the Netherlands, but his chief motives were ideological. He wanted to put
down a revolt against a lawful sovereign that threatened the monarchies of Europe.
Russia was short of funds and suﬀering a cholera epidemic. Yet it continued to
mobilise troops until late November, and responsible oﬃcials predicted that by the
end of the year they would be ready to act.68 Many scholars have concluded that it
64 Handwritten memorandum by Nicholas I, dated 1830 but probably from 1831, in A. M.
Z[aionchkovskii], Vostochnaia voina 1853–1856 gg., v sviazi s sovremmenoi ei politcheskoi
obstanovkoi: P[rilozheniia], vol. 1 (St. Petersburg: Ekspeditsiia zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh
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was only a revolt in Poland that stopped the Russians from going to war.69 Indeed,
Nicholas wrote that he was prepared to act unilaterally if he had the chance.70 But
almost at the same time the Russians were telling the Dutch and the allies they would
intervene only with the latter’s consent.71 The tsar, Nesselrode wrote the following
year, had recognised that military intervention must be ‘unanimous’.72 Petersburg’s
military preparations seem to have aimed more at pressing forward the other powers,
and preparing for multilateral intervention than in acting on its own.73
Nesselrode held that Russia must cooperate with the Western powers in order to
manage them. Nicholas, he wrote the next year, had agreed to take part in the
London conference in order ‘to keep England in the ranks of the alliance,’ and, by
involving the French, to draw their teeth as well.74 But the Russian foreign minister
also argued that allied consensus, particularly Britain’s support, was needed to keep
France in check, or to defeat it if war broke out. Prussia lacked enough troops even
to put down the Belgians, and could hardly bear the brunt of a French onslaught
alone.75 Agreement, he later wrote, had ‘seemed all the more necessary inasmuch as
it was easy to foresee that an armed intervention by the Quadruple Alliance . . .
would have to be prepared to encounter and combat . . . not only the Belgian
revolutionaries, but the French ones as well.’76 In a dispatch to his ambassador in
Vienna, Nesselrode wrote that Paris’s opposition had forced Nicholas to negotiate.77
While Petersburg was forced to act multilaterally, this was due less to norms than to
French deterrence.
Britain’s refusal to countenance intervention may well have been enough to
restrain the Russians. But even if Petersburg had gained London’s consent, it could
still not have acted without Berlin’s. The road to Belgium lay through Prussia; it is
hard to see how without Prussian cooperation the tsar could have mounted a land
invasion, the only kind he considered possible that late in the year.78 But Prussia had
little desire to act against the Belgians. Here too the balance of power is suﬃcient to
explain Berlin’s restraint. France had indicated it would resist intervention, and
Prussia knew it would bear the brunt of a clash. It needed soldiers to police the
Rhineland, and it would be slower than France to mobilise its forces if the latter
attacked. Prussia was also anxious to retain Britain’s support, but feared that if it
came to blows, Britain would support France. Berlin could not count on winning a
69 Betley, Belgium and Poland, p. 56; Martens, Recueil, vol. 8, pp. 171–2, and vol. 11, pp. 442.
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71 Betley, Belgium and Poland, p. 48–9; Fishman, Diplomacy and Revolution, pp. 61, 83.
72 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID),
op. 475, d. 1, ll. 39 ob.-40, quotation from l. 39 ob. Emphasis in original.
73 Nicholas I to Chernyshev, 5/17 October 1830, in N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi: ego
zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie, vol. 2 (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1903), p. 575; ‘Mezhdu dvumi voinami’,
pp. 393–5; cf. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, vol. 3, p. 26.
74 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID),
op. 475, d. 1, ll. 42–42 ob.
75 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, 3/15, 6/18 and 8/20 October 1830, AVPRI, f. 133 (Kantselariia), op. 469,
1830, d. 74, ll. 314–314 ob., 320–320 ob., 369, 371 ob., 385, 391–391 ob., 403; ‘Mezhdu dvumi
voinami’, pp. 387–8, 393–5.
76 Nesselrode to Nicholas I, annual report for 1830, 18/30 April 1831, AVPRI, f. 137 (Otchety MID),
op. 475, d. 1, ll. 40–40 ob., quotation from l. 40 ob.
77 Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, p. 90, n. 26.
78 Nicholas I to Chernyshev, 5/17 October 1830, in Shil’der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, vol. 2,
pp. 574–5; Heuser, Kein Krieg in Europa, pp. 90, 208.
Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe 535
war. ‘You cannot demand that we should bring upon ourselves . . . a war with
France,’ its foreign minister, Christian Bernstorﬀ, told the Dutch, ‘as well as with
four million Belgians, whom we should have to fight on our own’. No European
power, wrote King Frederick William III, could take on France by itself. Well before
Poland rose up, he turned down Holland’s appeal for aid, citing the risk of French
intervention. Bernstorﬀ wrote that even if the strategic picture had been more
favourable, war would sabotage the economy.79
But domestic factors also held Prussia back. Reliance on a non-professional army
made it ill-suited to oﬀensive warfare. Berlin believed war would stir up radical
passions, and that its troops were needed at home. In any case, after the Polish–
Saxon crisis, Prussia was not attracted by foreign conquests. ‘Regard for public
opinion helped to make Prussia a defensive, rather than oﬀensive, power’, writes
Lawrence Baack. ‘. . . Prussia did not want to conquer Germany by force. This was
distasteful, as well as being inherently unrealistic.’ Prussian oﬃcials believed the
public to be against war unless France attacked them first.80 ‘What do you expect?’
Bernstorﬀ’s successor asked a Russian oﬃcial in 1833. ‘. . . We cannot risk war with
France unless the war becomes a national aﬀair for us. We cannot undertake it, so
long as the public oﬀers no support.’81
Prussia’s leadership did not want to fight in any case. Expansion could stir up
domestic unrest. Taught to hate war in his youth, as an adult Frederick William had
only come to despise it more. In stark contrast to his famous predecessor Frederick
II, the leitmotif of his foreign policy was the eﬀort to preserve peace. ‘We should start
from the assumption,’ the king wrote in October 1830, ‘that the present political
situation. . . . can only be considered collectively by the great powers; hence only they
can specify the casus foederis.’ Perhaps even France could be grouped, with Belgium
proving an occasion ‘to bind it again in solidarity with the other powers to uphold
the status quo in Europe’. Bernstorﬀ felt a sincere – though not unconditional –
commitment to the solidarity of the old anti-Napoleonic coalition, and agreed that
Prussia should intervene only in agreement with its other members.82 While an
unfavourable balance of power is suﬃcient to explain Prussian restraint in 1830, it is
probably not necessary.83
Though Bismarck and his followers later charged that Prussia missed a chance to
exploit the situation for its own ends, Baack observes:
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[t]his evaluation confuses the Prussia of 1830 with the Prussia of the 1860s and postulates a
leadership that possessed an entirely diﬀerent set of political values. The central fact is that
Prussia at this time was a state of only moderate strength, and its leadership, although
aware of the potential of the nation-state, thought primarily in European terms – that also
happened to represent the interest of the state. Power was to be used responsibly and
morally. No one wanted to unleash the naked drive for territorial aggrandizement that had
nearly destroyed the European states decades earlier.
Capturing how power and preferences underpinned the post-Vienna order, Baack
argues that Prussia’s leadership was ‘being realistic as well as idealistic and
cosmopolitan.’84 As France’s ambassador wrote in early 1832, ‘The Emperor of
Russia will not succeed in inducing the Prussian Cabinet to adopt, [sic] either violent
views or hostile measures. Here, all the advantages derived from the statu quo are
fully appreciated and will not be forfeited.’85
France and the Syrian crisis of 1840
In July 1840, Austria, Britain, Prussia and Russia ordered the viceroy of Egypt,
Mehemet Ali, to withdraw from northern Syria on pain of military intervention. This
decision outraged France, Mehemet Ali’s patron, leading to what Schroeder calls
‘the worst crisis in Europe since 1815’. Much of France demanded war. King
Louis-Philippe and his prime minister, Adolphe Thiers, talked tough and began an
arms build-up. By October Britain’s prime minister, Lord Melbourne, was worried
suﬃciently to send France an ultimatum threatening war. Soon after, Louis-Philippe
forced Thiers out and the worst of the crisis was over.86
This decision was clearly dictated by the balance of power. As Louis-Philippe
made clear, France was not prepared for ‘a struggle of one against four’. The
ministers of the army and the navy argued that France was unprepared, and even
Thiers conceded in the end that France could not fight all of Europe. ‘We did not
want war,’ recalled the interior minister, ‘we did not aim at it, and among a thousand
reasons, one was decisive: France was not ready, and could not be for eight to nine
months.’87 Nevertheless Thiers hoped a military build-up would extract concessions.
If Mehemet Ali could hold out, ‘having completed our armament, we shall negotiate
at the head of our forces, and we shall perhaps make an advantageous peace’.88 The
prime minister – and apparently his cabinet colleagues – recognised that brinksman-
ship could lead to war instead. ‘[P]eople can get carried away’, Thiers wrote in
August, ‘some British and French boats can quarrel [s’insulter] in harbour; the
Viceroy can do something rash’.89 The king, however, was unwilling to risk the
confrontation spiralling out of control. ‘I believe no one wants war, and I still think
84 Bernstorﬀ, pp. 229, 338. Emphasis added.
85 Excerpt from Bresson to Talleyrand, 7 January 1832: MT, vol. 4, p. 259.
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no one can start it’, he told Thiers, ‘. . . But the dangerous thing is to have the same
confidence that it cannot break out.’90 Like Frederick William III, and ‘[u]nlike
Thiers with his conception of Napoleonic glory’, Louis-Philippe found war repug-
nant. ‘War, even successful, is fatal! It is a dunghill exhaling corruption!’91 Here, as
throughout his reign, the king restrained a public champing at the bit.
After 1840 the French government sought to preserve the European status quo.
Like Nesselrode and Bernstorﬀ, France’s new foreign minister and de facto head of
government, François Guizot, repudiated the European aggressions and conquests of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In part this was for fear of oﬀending
Britain, or that other states would gain more than France from reshuﬄing frontiers.
But Guizot also feared that war would bring domestic unrest and economic
disruption, and in any case he was content with France’s boundaries in Europe. Not
every Frenchman was a Louis-Philippe or Guizot. Most remained eager to overturn
the Vienna settlement, even if some believed it could be done only by peaceful means.
But the buck stopped at the Tuileries palace. Louis-Philippe’s hatred of war, fear of
domestic instability and desire to have his regime recognised abroad made France’s
policy essentially conservative.92
Conclusion
After 1815 the balance of power still played a major role. Above all, it restrained
France, the only dissatisfied power.93 While Alexander I was grouped in 1821, he also
may have been deterred, and Russian oﬃcials were careful to avoid a blocking
coalition in 1833. In Belgium, Schroeder is right that Petersburg had to act ‘with and
through its allies’,94 but this was not because it embraced multilateralism. Instead,
Russia needed its allies, above all London, if it came to a showdown with France.
Berlin in turn was unwilling to bear the brunt of a French attack. Britain and Russia
may have been strong enough to impose their desires when they acted together,
but Petersburg knew that aggression was likely to cause London to balance
against it. Britain also held the balance in the Belgian crisis between France and
Prussia; had either side committed aggression, London would surely have thrown its
support to the other. As Branislav Slantchev observes, ‘for every potentially
contestable territory, there existed some coalition of states that had a clear interest in
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blocking undesirable changes’.95 What Mearsheimer calls ‘balanced multipolarity’
did contribute to the peace and stability of the Vienna era.
Yet the great powers also responded readily to external constraints. ‘All the
powers were war-weary’, observes Alan Sked:
all of them intensely frightened by the thought of revolution. Most of them were
preoccupied by domestic problems and most of them were territorially satiated states. This
was true of Austria and Prussia. France, on the other hand, was for long periods
diplomatically isolated and could do very little to disturb the European balance. Russia,
who would have been much more capable of doing so, chose not to.96
In Russia’s case, this was partly because it had achieved defensible frontiers. In an
1828 memorandum approved by the tsar, Nesselrode argued that European con-
quests ‘in extending [Russia’s] territory would weaken her power.’97 States can
conclude that expansion will render their borders less defensible; when this is the case,
rational security-seekers support the status quo or retrenchment.
But the great powers’ restraint was also due to unit-level factors. Much of French
society would have backed war in 1840, but the king feared it would lead to
revolution.98 Conversely, even if Prussia’s leaders had wanted war in 1830, Prussian
society would not have supported intervention. Public opinion played little role in
Russia, but neither Alexander nor Nicholas shared Catherine II’s ambition to put a
Romanov on the throne in Constantinople. Both tsars, by nature and moral ethos,
were averse to rampant aggression. Until 1833 Nicholas sought greater influence and
modest territorial acquisitions from the Ottoman empire, but once he had achieved
this, he rested on his laurels.99 Tellingly, when the Vienna system collapsed, it was
largely unit-level factors that brought it down. Whether one blames the Crimean War
on Nicholas I’s pigheadedness, British and French domestic politics or Turkish
intriguing, clearly no big shift had occurred in the balance of power. While this war
is often depicted as tragedy, a strong case can be made that it was a crime.100
Kissinger gets it almost right in saying that ‘The balance of power inhibits the
capacity to overthrow the international order; agreement on shared values inhibits
the desire to overthrow the international order.’101 In reality, as time went by,
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Europe’s great powers agreed less and less on values. But four of the five remained
basically content with the status quo, and even France was not so bent on revenge as
post-World War I Germany.102 Once the Polish–Saxon crisis was past, territorial
disputes seldom marred great-power relations.103
The great powers had not lost all interest in expansion, but they were easy to deter.
In 1815 Alexander I backed away from a war which might have brought him
European hegemony, and which he probably thought he could win. While this does
not falsify Mearsheimer’s theory per se, it contradicts one of its underlying
assumptions: that states are prepared to take big risks in the pursuit of regional
dominance. In 1829 prominent Russian oﬃcials opposed taking Constantinople
largely for fear of ill-defined long term conflict with the other powers. Contrary to
Mearsheimer’s predictions, they repeatedly expressed satisfaction, even in internal
statements, with the European status quo. After 1815, Prussia was little inclined
toward aggression. Louis-Philippe might have liked to revise the postwar settlement,
but he was no Hitler, prepared to run huge risks to do so.
Oﬀensive realists are right that states face incentives for expansion, and are often
constrained by the international system. Defensive realists already recognise this,
however, while acknowledging that unit-level factors sometimes make states act in
ways not predicted by structure. Domestic factors just will not go away. Defensive
realists err not in combining structural and unit-level theories, but in insisting on
calling the whole amalgam ‘realist’. Snyder’s theory of over-expansion, for example,
uses realism to determine how states should behave, and a theory of domestic politics
to explain why they don’t.104 Realist theories should establish the external constraints
and incentives states face, not monopolise explanations of international politics. As
Waltz says, ‘Just as market theory at times requires a theory of the firm, so
international-political theory at times needs a theory of the state’.105 Structure
matters, but so does agency.
In the early nineteenth century Russia’s huge population and repressive domestic
policies made it seem threatening, much like China today. In reality, its leaders were
mostly content to uphold the European status quo. Unfortunately, many Westerners
mistook a bearish but essentially moderate power for a ravenous aggressor, feeding
suspicions that would contribute to the Crimean War. It would be a true tragedy
should assumptions rooted in structural determinism cause China to become the
Russia of the twenty-first century.
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